University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 1

Article 7

1980

The Status of the Third Party Confession in
Virginia: In Search of a Trustworthiness Standard
Donna J. Katos
University of Richmond

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence
Commons
Recommended Citation
Donna J. Katos, The Status of the Third Party Confession in Virginia: In Search of a Trustworthiness Standard, 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 173
(1980).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss1/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond
Law Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

THE STATUS OF THE THIRD PARTY CONFESSION IN
VIRGINIA: IN SEARCH OF A TRUSTWORTHINESS STANDARD
I. INTRODUCTION

The issue of third party confessions generates great controversy. The
basic inquiry is, should confessions allegedly uttered by persons other
than the defendant be admitted into evidence in a criminal trial? If so,
under what conditions? How much discretion should a trial judge be afforded in determining whether this evidence should be admitted to exculpate a person charged with murder, armed robbery, or rape? Should the
trial judge or the jury determine the reliability of the witness, the declarant, or the content of the confession itself? These considerations, in addition to due process arguments, have troubled criminal courts, legislators,
and recently the Supreme Court of Virginia in Ellison v. Commonwealth.1
The problems arise because third party confessions, distinguishable
from party admissions and confessions by the defendant, 2 are generally
held suspect and inadmissible as hearsay.' Because the third party declarant is usually not a party to the action, his confession is given without the
procedural protections of the oath and cross-examination. Additionally,
the risk of perjured testimony is considered high because "people may
prevaricate, despite the consequences to themselves, to exculpate those
1. 219 Va. 404, 247 S.E.2d 685 (1978).
2. Personal or party admissions are extrajudicial statements made by any party to a lawsuit. Any relevant admission may be introduced against the party at trial. First-hand knowledge of the matter declared is not required nor does the statement need to be against the
declarant's interest at the time it is made. See G. LILy, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 77 (1978); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 276 (2d ed.
1972); Jefferson, Declarations against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58
HARV. L. REV. 1, 63 (1944).
Confessions are out-of-court statements made by an accused and offered against him at
trial. They will be admissible as evidence against the accused as long as they were voluntarily made. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Noe v. Commonwealth, 207 Va.
849, 153 S.E.2d 248 (1967) (held that it is court's duty to ascertain whether a confession was
freely and voluntarily made prior to admitting it into evidence).
3. The hearsay rule precludes the admission of out-of-court statements being offered at
trial to show the truth of matters asserted therein. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 246.
Confessions of defendants and admissions are exceptions to the hearsay rule because of the
nature of the adversary system. Id. § 262. The hearsay rule has been criticized as being an
inherently weak rule "which admits more under its exceptions than it excludes under its
general provisions .
" Note, Erosion of the Hearsay Rule, 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 89, 95
(1968).
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they love or fear, to inculpate
those they hate or because they are inveter4
ate or pathological liars.

Notwithstanding these general arguments against the admissibility of
third party confessions, certain states, including Virginia, have sidestepped the hearsay rule and have allowed these extrajudicial confessions
into evidence under the "declaration against penal interest" exception. 5
Generally, to qualify as admissible evidence, the declaration must have
been adverse to the nonparty declarant's interest when the statement was
made. The unavailability of the declarant must also be established when
testimony concerning the third party confession is proffered.' This latter
requirement provokes the "necessity" aspect of the exception, for without
the testimony, often the most probative evidence would be altogether
omitted7 and an innocent person found guilty. The trustworthiness of the
statement is derived from its disserving quality and the belief that a person would not make such a statement unless it were true.8 Nevertheless,
since a third party confession, by its very nature, usually tends to exculpate the accused, most courts require further indicia of trustworthiness in
determining admissibility. The imposition of somewhat nebulous and
broad standards of trustworthiness presents problems in interpretation
and application. This comment traces the historical background of the
third party confession in Virginia and seeks to define its current status by
placing Virginia's recently articulated standard of trustworthiness into
perspective with the United States Supreme Court standard, Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), and other state trends.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DECLARATION AGAINST PENAL
INTEREST

The declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule had its
beginning in English courts in the early eighteenth century.9 However,
this exception was not without limitations. In the famous Sussex Peerage
4. People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154,

(1978).

-,

385 N.E.2d 612, 619, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 882

5. "The majority of states still do not admit such statements if they are solely against
penal interest, i.e., would expose the declarant to a criminal prosecution but would not
otherwise affect financial or property interests." C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 234 (1977).

6. Id.
7. "It is the best evidence available in many instances, and should be presented to the
trier of fact for what it is worth." Note, Erosion of the Hearsay Rule, supra note 3, at 102.
8. Jefferson, supra note 2, at 63; C. FRIEND, supra note 5. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3) uses the
"reasonable man" test. See note 56 infra for a statement of that rule.
9. See generally 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1476 (Chadbourn ed. 1974).
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Case, the court confined the admissibility of declarations against interest
to statements of fact against either proprietary or pecuniary interests.10
This rule was followed in American courts until questioned in 1913 by the
United States Supreme Court in Donnelly v. United States."" Although
the Court refused to allow the exculpatory third party confession into evidence and upheld the defendant's conviction, the dissenting opinion by
Justice Holmes provided a sound argument for disregarding the old distinctions and the exclusion of penal interests. It stated, in part:
There is no decision by this court against the admissibility of such a confession; the English cases since the separation of the two countries do not bind
us; the exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well known; no other statement is so much against interest as a
confession of murder ....

2

The limitation was also criticized by scholars such as Wigmore, who felt
excluding declarations against penal interest was a "novelty of judicial
invention."' 8
In 1923, in Hines v. Commonwealth,1 4 the Virginia Supreme Court, following the lead provided in an earlier decision, Karnes v. Commonwealth,'5 adopted the minority view and stated that it would follow the
rule of "right and reason"16 by allowing an exculpatory third party confession into evidence. In Hines, the accused and the third party declarant
were connected to the murder by similar motive and circumstantial evidence. 17 The third party declarant had confessed to several persons
10. 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844) (held to exclude the statement of a fact allegedly subjecting
the declarant, since deceased, to criminal liability).
11. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
12. Id. at 278 (Holmes, Lurton, and Hughes, JJ., dissenting).
13. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 1477. Wigmore believed the practical result of such a
limitation would be "shocking to the sense of justice" since it required rejecting a confession
"however well authenticated, of a person deceased or insane or fled from the jurisdiction
(and therefore quite unavailable) who has avowed himself to be the true culprit." Id.
14. 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
15. 125 Va. 758, 99 S.E. 562 (1919), in which the court held it was error to exclude declarations of the deceased made to the defendant and others, concerning a third party who had
threatened the deceased. The court seemed to impose a "double standard" approach in its
rationale: "The testimony to which we have referred would have been clearly admissible on
behalf of the Commonwealth in the prosecution of [the third party] for the crime, and in
our judgment it is equally admissible in favor of the accused as tending to show that he was
not guilty." Id. at 766, 99 S.E. at 565.
16. 136 Va. at 743, 117 S.E. at 847.
17. Both Hines and the declarant possessed guns similar to the murder weapon which
killed the police officer; both wore hats similar to the cap found by the victim's body, and
both had threatened police officers several times before. Id. at 734-36, 117 S.E. at 844-45.
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before his death that he was responsible for the murder. Were it not for
the admission of the proffered testimony of the deceased declarant's confession to the crime, the supreme court would have sustained the defendant's conviction. The court reasoned that the after-acquired affidavits,
including the confessions which were "clearly admissible under the circumstances," were material. However, the court did not specify any standard of trustworthiness and merely held that whether the new evidence
was worthy of belief was a question for the jury, not the court.18 Although
the declarant's confession in Hines was corroborated by other facts linking him to the crime, the court appeared ready, at one point, to state a
broad rule of admissibility of even "bare confessions" made by unavailable or deceased third party declarants. However, because the decision
was "out of line with the current of authority," the court limited
the ef19
fect of its decision to the particular facts of the case at bar.
Other courts, in a minority of states,20 similarly discarded the "barba18. Id. at 750-51, 117 S.E. at 849-50. The court stated the following test:
If a charge involving the life or liberty of a citizen, and depending solely upon
circumstantial evidence, cannot stand the test of allowing the jury to determine from
the testimony whether a third party has in fact confessed guilt, and if so whether
such confession was true, a conviction ought not to follow.
Id. at 741, 117 S.E. at 846. Cf. Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 167, Va. 578, 189 S.E. 144
(1937). The supreme court in Zimmerman recognized that under the rule in Hines, the after-acquired evidence (consisting of two affidavits in which a principal witness had confessed) would have been admissible as material and would have gone to the jury. However,
due to several counter-affidavits which denied the truth of every material statement alleged
by the accused to have been after-acquired testimony, the trial judge was given discretion to
weigh the evidence. The court held that the alleged confession, absent corroboration, was
"not in accord with the usual experience of mankind" and affirmed the lower court conviction. Id. at 586-88, 189 S.E. at 148-49.
19. The Hines opinion states:
[A]lthough the great majority of decisions are apparently in conflict with our view,
very few of them involve the unusual combination of circumstances appearing in this
case. In most of the decided cases the declarant was not shown to be unavailable as a
witness; and in many of them there was nothing but the bare confession of the declarant to connect him with the crime .... [W]e are disposed to think that the evidence
of even a bare confession by a deceased or unavailable witness ought to go to the jury
for what they may consider it worth; but as our decision here must be regarded as out
of line with the current of authority, we will expressly limit its effect as a precedent
in this court to the particular facts of the case in hand.
136 Va. at 747, 117 S.E. at 848.
20. See, e.g., People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal.2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964) (held
it was prejudicial to defendant to be denied the opportunity to establish that another party
admitted to possession of heroin); State v. Leong, 51 Hawaii 581, 465 P.2d 560 (1970) (held
trial court erred in refusing testimony that party with the defendant at time of arrest for
drug possession had thrown narcotics out the car window); People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill.
172,
108 N.E.2d 488 (1952) (held it would shock sense of justice not to allow a third party confes-
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rous doctrine,"2" which allowed only declarations against pecuniary or
property interests. In Newberry v. Commonwealth, 2 the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed Hines. The defendant in Newberry, a brutal murder case, was convicted, along with his brother, of murdering the former's
wife. The defendant had voluntarily signed a written statement explaining the circumstances of the killing, and was apprised that it would be
used against him.23 However, the lower court refused to admit into evidence the written and corroborated confession of the defendant's brother
which stated that he alone had murdered the deceased.24 Since Newberry's brother was available, but refused to testify, the trial court held
that the hearsay rule barred the testimony.2 The supreme court, however, citing Hines and Karnes, reversed and remanded, holding that a
refusal to testify is sufficient to qualify a witness as unavailable and
stated "[i]f he is unavailable as a witness his confession may be used." 26
As in Hines, the Newberry court left the credibility and weight of the
proffered testimony to the jury, reasoning that "[i]f the
jury believed this
'27
evidence it might have produced a different result.
Thus until 1978, the standard of admissibility for third party confessions in Virginia was a broad rule which only required that the declarant
be unavailable and that there be something more than a bare confession
sion where not a scintilla of evidence connected the defendant with the crime except a repudiated confession); Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446, 47 A.2d 43 (1946) (held where police
officer obtained two contradictory confessions, defendant should be allowed to question the
officer about them); Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945) (held where an
affidavit consisted of an admission that the declarant was engaged in criminal conspiracy
resulting in perjury, it is unlikely to be deliberately false and is admissible as evidence);
People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970) (held that a more
"rational view of admissibility" be adopted where the third party confession had significant
bearing on defendant's claim of self-defense); Blocker v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 30, 114 S.W.
814 (1908) (held where evidence against accused was wholly circumstantial and declarant's
motive was strong, the third party confession was admissible). See Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d
1164, § 4 (1979).
21. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 1477. One article commenting on the minority view of
People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal.2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964), suggests that "[i]n
the absence of any logical, clearly defined reason for distinguishing between penal interest
and pecuniary or proprietary interest, . . . it is difficult to understand the strict, almost
blind, adherence to the exclusionary rule by most American courts." 26 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 129,
133 (1964).
22. 191 Va. 445, 61 S.E.2d 318 (1950).
23. Id. at 457, 61 S.E.2d at 324.
24. Newberry's brother signed a written confession and orally confessed to a woman in
the presence of another. Id. at 460, 61 S.E.2d at 325.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 461-62, 61 S.E.2d at 326 (citation omitted).
27. Id.
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connecting the declarant with the crime. The truthfulness of the testimony was a question for the jury.
III. THE STATUS OF THE THIRD PARTY CONFESSION TODAY:
Ellison v. Commonwealth
A.

Facts

In 1978, the Supreme Court of Virginia "emasculated" its prior holdings on declarations against penal interest by imposing a strict standard
of reliability which the defendant could not meet when proffering testimony of a third party confession."8 Applying this strict standard, the
court upheld Ellison's conviction for robbery and murder.
The defendant was allegedly among three assailants who shot and
killed a restaurant manager in the course of robbing him of his credit
cards, a hundred dollars in cash, and a radio.2 Ellison repudiated a confession he made to an undercover agent, alleging it was a falsification of
information "heard on the street."3 0 He proffered the exculpatory testimony of a witness, Karen Hampton. Hampton's testimony indicated that
she had been approached by a third party, Joseph Brown, who admitted
that he was in trouble with the police because he was "supposed to have
splattered some [man]" at the restaurant where the victim was killed.
Hampton further testified that Brown complained that he had only gotten "a lousy hundred dollars and this radio," which he tried to sell to her.
He also expressed concern over what Betty, who worked at the restaurant, "was going to do." ' Even though the unavailability of Brown was
established at the trial,82 the supreme court found no error in excluding
28. The dissenting opinion stated that the Hines and Newberry rules were emasculated
and that Hines in particular, was "diluted" as an effective truth-searching device by the
Ellison decision. 219 Va. at 412, 247 S.E.2d at 690 (Compton, J., dissenting).

29. Id. at 405, 247 S.E.2d at 686.
30. Ellison alleged that he confessed to the robbery and murder to induce the purported
underworld figures to take him out of town. Id. at 406, 247 S.E.2d at 686.
31. Id. at 406, 247 S.E.2d at 686-87. Another witness testified that she had observed
Hampton and Brown talking, but did not overhear them, Id.
32. Id. at 407, 247 S.E.2d at 687. Unavailability of the third party was not a determinative issue in the Ellison decision. Since it generally necessitates the declaration against pe-

nal interest exception, the defendant's attorney asserted that Brown was unavailable because he had been subpoenaed, but his whereabouts were unknown by both his mother and
his attorney. In any event, the latter had stated that he would advise Brown to exercise his
right against self-incrimination. Brief for Appellant at 9, Ellison v. Commonwealth, 219 Va.
404, 247 S.E.2d 685 (1978). The Attorney General rebutted this contention by stating that
"temporary absence should not be equated to unavailability" and that an attorney's advice
not to testify is not binding on an individual in the exercise of his constitutional rights.
Brief for Appellee at 9. The court did not rule on this issue.
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Hampton's testimony because the defendant had failed to establish the
trustworthiness of the content of Brown's confession.3 3
B. Analysis: In Search of a Trustworthiness Standard
Notwithstanding the defendant's assertions that in Virginia, according
to Hines and Newberry, a declaration against penal interest by an unavailable witness is admissible without proof of reliability,' the court
stated that "neither case stands for the proposition,. . . that a 'bare confession' is admissible without supporting proof of its reliability. Indeed we
believe both cases stand for the contrary proposition."3 The court further distinguished the earlier decisions as being limited to their facts and
as having confessions which were corroborated by several witnesses and
other extrinsic evidence."
The defendant further argued that even if reliability was required, the
testimony of Brown's confession was sufficiently reliable since it had
caused the initial indictment of Brown for the crime in question.3 7 The
33. 219 Va. at 409, 247 S.E.2d at 688.
34. The counsel for the defense referred to the requirement for trustworthiness as the
"court's unknown standard of reliability." Brief for Appellant at 2. The brief also mentioned
that when the defendant's attorney asked the trial court to specify what quantum of evidence was necessary to prove reliability, the trial court refused and stated only that the
evidence adduced was insufficient. Brief for Appellant at 15.
35. 219 Va. at 407, 247 S.E.2d at 687.
36. Id. at 408, 247 S.E.2d at 687-88. In distinguishing the cases it is interesting to note
that in Hines and Newberry the Commonwealth had a much stronger case against the defendants than it did in Ellison. In Hines, the evidence, though purely circumstantial, would
have been sufficient to sustain a conviction. Nevertheless, the court allowed the after-acquired evidence and the testimony of the third party confession because they showed that
the third party was as closely connected with the crime as the accused. 136 Va. at 738-39,
117 S.E. at 846. Similarly in Newberry, but for the admission of the exculpatory declaration
against penal interest, the defendant's original conviction would have been upheld. In
Ellison, the defendant was connected to the crime solely by his repudiated confession.
Therefore, it would seem that the weaker the case against the defendant, the more likely the
Commonwealth would be to admit testimony equally incriminatory of a third party. For
example, in People v. Lettrich, where there was nothing to connect the defendant with the
murder except a repudiated confession made to the police under circumstances indicating
some duress, the Illinois Supreme Court held it was error to refuse into evidence the testimony of the director of a behavior clinic to show that another person had confessed to the
same murder to him. 413 Ill.
172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952). But cf. People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d
154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978) (holding whether court believes a declaration
against penal interest is true is irrelevant, and the question of admissibility is to be resolved
without regard to the seeming strength or weakness of the prosecutor's case).
37. 219 Va. at 409, 247 S.E.2d at 688. Based upon Hampton's testimony, Brown was arrested and subsequently indicted by the grand jury. However, when the Commonwealth's
Attorney learned of Ellison's confession, the charges against Brown were nolle prossed. Id.
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court held that it was irrelevant that Brown had been indicted or that
Hampton was under oath and subject to cross-examination at Brown's
hearing, because the issue was not whether Brown actually confessed or
whether Hampton was a reliable witness. Rather, the court stated the relevant issue was whether the content of Brown's confession was reliable.8 5
The opinion provided that in resolving this issue, the record must be
searched for "indicia of trustworthiness" which may take the form of (1)
evidence from other witnesses to whom the declarant confessed; (2) extrinsic evidence connecting the declarant with the crime; (3) "or a satisfactory combination of both."3 9 However, because Hampton was the only
witness to corroborate the confession, the court struck down all evidence
tending to connect Brown with the crime, including the facts that he said
he had supposedly "splattered" some man and had in his possession the
same type radio-tape player as the one stolen from the victim.4 0 While
the above "indicia of trustworthiness" appear consistent with the earlier
decisions, the rigidity in which the court applied the requirements demonstrates that, in reality, it demanded a satisfactory combination of both
indicia.
The trustworthiness of the confession was not left to the determination
of the jury as in Hines and Newberry.41 The Ellison court dispelled the
truth of the confession on the same theory that the defendant had used
to repudiate his own confession: that it was merely repetition of information heard "on the street" and therefore, the facts in the confession "were
not of such a unique nature that they would have been known only by an
actual perpetrator of the . . . crimes. ' ' 42 The court hypothesized that if
Brown had wanted to "impress Hampton," he could have easily gathered
these facts on the street.43 The dissenting opinion points out that "[i]n its
effort to justify the conclusion that the content of the confession was untrustworthy," the majority used this street knowledge argument and
thereby disregarded "[a]nother equally compelling deduction," that the
confession was true.44 The question of choosing between such inferences
at 406-07, 247 S.E.2d at 687.
38. Id. at 409, 247 S.E.2d at 688.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 410, 247 S.E.2d at 689.
41. See notes 18 & 27 supra.
42. 219 Va. at 410, 247 S.E.2d at 689 (emphasis added).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 415, 247 S.E.2d at 691 (Compton, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). One
year prior to Ellison, the Supreme Court of Virginia in Hyde v. Commonwealth, ruled that

the third party confession "be accepted in full or rejected in full," and reversed and remanded. 217 Va. 950, 956-57, 234 S.E.2d 74, 79 (1977). In that case, the defendant's involvement in a rape and murder was contradicted by his statements and by a third party confes-
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should be for the jury.45

Ellison's last argument was based on the constitutional claim that to
apply the hearsay rule and refuse him the right to present testimony
before the jury, was violative of due process. The defendant based his
assertion on the 1973 Supreme Court decision in Chambers v. Mississippi.4 There the Court, in reversing a murder conviction, held that to
deny the accused the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant or present evidence corroborating the confession constituted a denial of the fair
opportunity to defend. 4 7 In Ellison, the court summarily distinguised
Chambers, then rejected the defendant's argument on the technical
ground that the defendant had failed to "complain" that he had been
denied the right to cross-examine Brown.48 The court also added that the
defendant had not been refused the opportunity to introduce testimony
concerning a third party confession supported by considerable assurance
of reliability, but that "the defendant
simply was unable to establish the
49
reliability of Brown's confession."'

The Ellison court did not rely on the Supreme Court standard enunciated in Chambers, nor did it find the due process argument applicable to
the facts and circumstances of the case. Several state courts which now
recognize the declaration against penal interest exception have been more
reluctant to disregard the Chambers ruling.5 0
C.

The Supreme Court Standard
The Chambers court reasoned that the hearsay statements involved in

sion, which was later repudiated. The court held "conviction cannot rest upon conjecture"
and the opinion suggested that if the declaration were rejected as unreliable, the record
would be void of what really happened. Id. at 957, 234 S.E.2d at 79. Thus the opinion in
Ellison appears to allow more speculation as to the reliability of the third party confession
than the prior decisions would permit.
45. Ellison v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. at 415, 247 S.E.2d at 691 (Compton, J., dissenting).
46. 410 U.S. 284 (1973), cited with authority in Ellison v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 404,
411, 247 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1978).
47. 410 U.S. at 302-303.
48. 219 Va. at 411, 247 S.E.2d at 689. It is interesting to note that in Chambers, Justice
Rehaquist, in his dissent, felt that the defendant in that case did not properly raise the
constitutional issue of which he complained. Rehnquist stated that "the litigant ... must
not only object or otherwise advise the lower court of his claim that a ruling is error, but he
must make it clear that his claim of error is constitutionallygrounded." 410 U.S. at 308
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
49. 219 Va. at 411, 247 S.E.2d at 689.
50. See note 51 infra. See also Commonwealth v. Nash, 324 A.2d 344 (Pa. 1974) (remanded for new trial even though testimony of third party confession was not supported by
reliable, corroborative evidence, since the case was tried prior to the holding in Chambers).
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that case provided "considerable assurance of their reliability" because of
the circumstances under which they were made. These indicia of reliability included: (1) each confession was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred; (2) each one was corroborated by some other evidence, e.g., a sworn confession or testimony of
an eyewitness; (3) each confession was self-incriminatory and unquestionably against interest; and (4) the declarant was available and under
oath. 51 This latter indicium abrogates the common law requirement that
the declarant be unavailable to necessitate the hearsay exception. Modern
courts which adopt the declaration against penal interest exception and
follow the four-pronged test of Chambers, similarly require availability. 2
In comparing the Virginia standard of trustworthiness with the Chambers test, the disposition of the Ellison case would have been the same.
The key indicia of reliability in both standards require that there be more
than one witness and substantial corroborating evidence. However, the
other indicia are distinguishable because the Chambers court felt confes51. 410 U.S. at 300-01. The declarant was available in Chambers because the defense put
him on the stand. However, under the Mississippi voucher rule, the trial court refused to
allow the declarant to be used as an adverse witness, thus excluding cross-examination as to
his confession to the murder. Justice Powell, in his opinion for the Court, found this
voucher rule precluded defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. Id. at 295-98. An
article discussing three Supreme Court cases dealing with the right of confrontation questions the applicability of the Chambers standard:
[Ilt is unclear whether a refusal to admit a corroborated declaration against penal
interest per se would occasion a reversal. Since this exception generally operates to
exculpate a defendant, is it reasonable to assume that a less stringent standard of
trustworthiness would apply when defendant offers hearsay? Or is the demand for
corroboration simply a substitute device to guarantee trustworthiness? .

.

. These

questions are left unanswered by Chambers,. . . leaving the lower courts with insurmountable conceptual and analytical problems.
Natali, Green, Dutton and Chambers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J.
43, 54 (1975).
52. See, e.g., U.S. v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839
(1977) (held court's application of Rule 804(b)(3) is guided by four factor test in Chambers
and excluded testimony by a government informant who could not be located and who had
confessed to a stranger, the informant, some four months after the murder); People v. Foster, 66 IMI.App. 3d 292, 383 N.E.2d 788 (1978) (court strictly adhered to Chambers test and
refused a third party confession where statement was made to a virtual stranger, there was
no corroborating evidence, and the declarant was not available). Accord, People v. Woodruff, 63 IlM. App. 3d 949, 379 N.E.2d 907 (1978); People v. Craven, 54 I1.2d 419, 299 N.E.2d 1
(1973); Thompson v. State, 309 S.2d 533 (Miss. 1975); State v. Brown, 85 Wis.2d 341, 270
N.W.2d 87 (Wis. App. 1978). But cf. United States v. Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974)
(held, as in Chambers, that there were corroborative circumstances giving an aura of trustworthiness to the third party confession but did not require that the declarant be available
for cross-examination).

1980]

THIRD PARTY CONFESSION

183

sion to a close acquaintance was more reliable; the Virginia court made no
such distinction. Additionally, the Virginia Supreme Court did not require availability of the declarant as did the Chambers court. Thus, on
application, the Chambers standard could produce a harsher result than
the Virginia test. However, by adding the requirement that the content of
the confession be considered trustworthy at the trial court's discretion,
the Virginia standard presents an equally difficult challenge to a defense
attorney seeking to introduce evidence of a third party confession.
The application of the Chambers standard is clearly not mandatory on
the lower state courts. In the opinion, the Court expressly limited its ruling to the facts of the case where constitutional rights were directly involved. Similarly, the Court stated it did not intend to diminish state
criminal trial rules and procedures.5 3
IV.

VIRGINIA'S STANDARD IN LIGHT OF RECENT FEDERAL AND STATE
TRENDS

Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), 5" which allows the penal interest
exception where the declarant is unavailable, 55 has provided an appropriate guideline for many states. In its proposed form, the rule contained no
provision for trustworthiness and used the reasonable man test to ascertain the reliability of the declaration. An exculpatory statement needed
corroboration to be admissible. 5"
In 1975, the codification of Federal Rule 804(b)(3) raised the standard
of admissibility of exculpatory declarations against penal interest by requiring corroborating circumstances which "clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 5 7 The Judiciary Committee did not elabo53. 410 U.S. at 302-03.

54. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
55. For the definition of unavailability, see FED. R. EvID. 804(a).
56. In its proposed form as submitted by the Court, Rule 804(b)(4) (now 804(b)(3)),
provided:
(4) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or so far tended to
subject him to civil or criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by him against
another or to make him an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be
true. A statement tending to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborated.
Notes of Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. 93-650, (Note to Subdivision (b)(3)), reprinted in 28
U.S.C.A., FED. R. EvrD. at 691 (1975).

57. The Rule now reads:
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:173

rate on what degree of corroboration was required but felt the adopted
language afforded "a proper standard and degree of discretion."s A sampling of recent cases applying Federal Rule 804(b)(3) demonstrates the
varied interpretations this open-ended rule allows.59
Although the opinion in Ellison did not allude to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), the Attorney General did in his brief. He argued that if
the statement against penal interest lacks inherent trustworthiness, its
rejection is mandated, and, as with all evidence, its admissibility remains
within the discretion of the trial judge6 0 The court's opinion adopted that
view.
Some states have provided legislation in order to fix a standard of admissibility for declarations against penal interest; Virginia is not yet
among them. Several state provisions are modeled after Federal Rule
subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against
another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement
unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).

58. Notes of Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. 93-650, note 56 supra.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1978) (decision mollifies the
language of 804(b)(3) by stating that the declarant need not be aware of immediate criminal
prosecution when making the declaration; however, the declaration by the third party was
held inadmissible because it lacked indicia of reliability and evidence of first-hand knowledge); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978) (the court devised a "unitary"
system as a standard for determining the application of Federal Rule 804(b)(3) to inculpatory statements and stated it would analyze the veracity of the in-court witness and the outof-court declarant); United States v. Sattrfield, 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1978) (absence of
required corroboration, e.g., length of time between robberies and declarations and accusation not "sufficiently integral" to entire statement, indicated that declarations against interest were clearly untrustworthy); United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978) (held Rule 804(b)(3) directs the court to the trustworthiness of
the declarant, not the witness); United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977) (held the two distinct elements of trustworthiness require that
the statement be actually made by the declarant and that it afford a basis for the truth of
the matter asserted). But see People v. Edwards, 396 Mich. 551, 242 N.W.2d 739 (1976)
(held statement of a witness that a third party declarant, since deceased, had confessed to a
murder for which defendant was charged, was admissible without a preliminary showing of
trustworthiness). The Michigan court rejected the "double standard" that Rule 804(b)(3)
imposes by requiring trustworthiness for an exculpatory confession. The court noted: "Such
a rule is based on an assumption that criminal defendants are more likely to use perjured
testimony. We refuse to predicate a rule of law upon such an assumption." 396 Mich. at -,
242 N.W.2d at 746. For a thorough discussion of this case, see Comment, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q.
349.
60. Brief for Appellee at 4.
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804(b)(3).1 However, the application of these rules is subject to the discretion of the trial judge, so the problem of how much corroboration is
needed still exists, and the requirements vary from case to case."2 The
remaining jurisdictions, like Virginia, who recognize the hearsay exception, have fashioned their own standards of trustworthiness. 3 Maryland
has recently articulated its very liberal view that a declaration against
penal interest is inherently trustworthy even standing alone, and will not
be excluded unless there is evidence that it is "untrustworthy, frivolous or
61. State statutes which have adopted Rule 804(b)(3) are: ARiz. R. EvID. 804(b)(3); ARK.
R. EVID. 804(b)(3); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(c)(West); ME. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); MICH. R.
EVID. 804(b)(3); MINN. R. EvD. 804(b)(3)(West); MONT. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); NEB. R. EVID.
804(2)(c); NEv. REv. STAT. § 51.345(d); N.M.R. EvD. 804(b)(4); N.D.R. EvID. 804(b)(3);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2804(B)(3)(West); S.D.R. EVID. 19-16-32; Wyo. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). State
statutes which have adopted part of Rule 804(b)(3) but have omitted the trustworthiness
requirement are: CAL.EVID. CODE § 1230 (West); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(j); N.J.R. EVID.
63(10); and Wis. R. EvIn. 908.045(4)(West). Prior to the adoption of Rule 804(b)(3), Professor Morgan expressed his concern over the need for legislation in the area of the declaration
against interest exception. He wrote:
[R]arely in the application of a rule of law can be found such a conglomeration of
inconsistencies, such flat contradictions in the facts of the very basis of the rule declared to be applied. It is utterly useless to attempt to harmonize the decisions or
even to understand the intellectual processes of the writers of many of the opinions.
The need for intelligent legislation is clearly indicated.
Morgan, DeclarationsAgainst Interest, 5 VAND. L. REv. 451, 476 (1952).
62. A New Jersey opinion, liberally applying its statutory provision, stated its standard of
admissibility as being "whether, in the context of the whole statement, the particular remark was plausibly against the declarant's penal interest, even though it might be neutral
or even self-serving if considered alone." State v. Abrams, 140 N.J. Super. 232, -, 356 A.2d
26, 28 (1976) (emphasis added) (applying N.J.R. EvID. 63(10)).
For an example of the California statute in application, see People v. Chapman, 50 Cal.
App. 3d 872, 123 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1975). The California court provided that in determining
trustworthiness, a judge may.consider the words uttered, whether a reasonable man in declarant's position would have made the statement unless it were true, and the circumstances
under which the statment was made. Additionally, the trial judge may analyze the possible
motivation of the declarant and the latter's relationship to the defendant. 50 Cal. App. 3d at
-, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 866-67. The court has clearly given much discretion to the trial judge,
similar to the court's position in the Ellison opinion: See also State v. Macumber, 119 Ariz.
516, 582 P.2d 162 (1978) (Amnz. R. EvD.804(b)(3)); People v. Dortch, 84 Mich. App. 184,
269 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. App. 1978) (MICH. R. Evwn. 804(b)(3)).
63. For a survey of various state and federal standards of trustworthiness prior to 1977,
see Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standards of Admissibility Under an
Emerging Majority Rule, 56 B.U.L. REV. 148 (1976). The author proposes that courts and
legislatures need only apply "six foundation factors" to establish the trustworthiness of declarations against penal interest. Id. at 155. He criticizes the imposition of additional indicia
of reliability under the rationale that the trial judge's role should be limited to the "threshold determination of the probability of trustworthiness." Id. The author does concede, however, that if the foundation factors have been established imperfectly, then corroboration as
an indication of reliability may be valuable. Id. at 177.
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collusive."' Washington's stricter standard requires that its minimal criteria include corroboration which clearly indicates the high probability of
trustworthiness."5 West Virginia recently relaxed its previous view which
excluded declarations against penal interest, and decided that when a
trial court is faced with losing the benefits of the out-of-court testimony
altogether, it must examine the facts and determine if the testimony is so
unreliable as to compel exclusion. 6 Indiana and North Carolina are
among the jurisdictions that still explicitly reject the declaration against
7
penal interest exception.

The New York standard in People v. Settles s appears, on its face, to
be analogous to the Virginia standard of trustworthiness. The Settles
opinion requires that the declarant have competent knowledge of the
facts underlying the statement.6 9 Brown's incompetent knowledge of the
facts, which the Ellison court found was probably gathered from street
information, was one reason the court did not reverse the trial court decision which excluded the extrajudicial confession. Similarly, the New York
court, felt that the crucial issue was ascertaining the intrinsic trustworthiness of the statement itself. 0 However, the analogy ends there. In the
application of its standard, the Settles court held that supportive evi64. Harris v. State, 387 A.2d 1152, 1156 (Md. App. 1978). That case held admissible a
codefendant's jailhouse confession which exculpated the defendant and substantiated his
statements made to the police upon arrest. The only argument the state made regarding the
confession's untrustworthiness was that the declarant was merely bragging to his fellow inmates. The court rejected that argument as speculative and reversed the conviction. Id. at
1155-56. Under the Maryland standard, Brown's confession in the Ellison case probably
would have been admissible as the court would not have been allowed to speculate why
Brown confessed to Hampton.
65. State v. Bjelland, 22 Wash. App. 696, 591 P.2d 865 (1979) (affidavit, later repudiated
as being made under pressure, was held inadmissible as exculpatory declaration against
penal interest since the circumstances under which it was made negated any degree of
trustworthiness).
66. State v. Williams, - W. Va. -, 249 S.E.2d 752 (1978) (reversed and remanded convictton for armed robbery so that trial court could determine if the evidence was sufficiently
reliable for admissibility). Factors the trial judge should consider are the self-in erest of the
declarant, the trustworthiness of the witness, and the presence of any other corroborating
evidence to show reliability. Id. at -, 249 S.E.2d at 757.
67. See Taggart v. State, - Ind.
882 N.E.2d 916 (1978); State v. Honeycutt, 37 N.C.
3,
App. 50, 245 S.E.2d 376 (1978). See also, United States v. Brandenfels, 522 F.2d 1259 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); Breeden v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., - Tenn. _
530 S.W.2d 769 (1975) (Tennessee Supreme Court recognized penal interest exception for
the first time, but limited its holding to civil cases). See also Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 1164
(1979).
68. 46 N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
69. Id. at -, 385 N.E.2d at 619, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
70. Id. at -, 385 N.E.2d at 620, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
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dence is admissible if it establishes "a reasonable possibility that the
statement might be true."71 Examples the court gave of supportive evidence included eyewitness testimony placing the declarant at the scene of
the crime, "or proof of his possession of the fruits or instrumentalities
used to commit the crime. . . . 2 Thus evidence of Brown's possession
of the stolen radio plus his statement against interest might have established a reasonable possibility of reliability if the Ellison case had been
tried under the New York standard. Once the possibility of trustworthiness was established, the rest would be left to the jury.73
V.

CONCLUSION

What then is the status of the third party confession in Virginia today?
To the extent that Virginia was a forerunner in admitting the declaration
against penal interest exception, it has recanted its position by imposing
a new standard of trustworthiness which will make it more difficult for
defendants to proffer exculpatory third party confessions. The Ellison decision limits the applicability of the Chambers standard to cases where
the defendant has expressly complained of due process violation. While it
may have considered Federal Rule 804(b)(3) as an appropriate standard,
it has raised the requirements of that rule to include testimony of more
than one witness in addition to substantial corroboration. Although the
court in Ellison purported not to delineate the quantity or quality of evidence necessary to establish reliability,74 it impliedly has done so. This is
evidenced by the requirement of a satisfactory combination of indicia of
trustworthiness, and by the court's refusal to admit facts that are not
unique, or at the least, within the scope of street knowledge. Of ultimate
significance however, is that the court has further obfuscated the status of
the third party confession by requiring that the content of the confession
be trustworthy. The difficulties in this requirement are apparent; it would
seem that the better standard would be that once the evidence is proven
admissible, the trustworthiness of the content should be settled by the
jury. Whether this new standard will be strictly adhered to in future
criminal cases remains in the sole discretion of the trial judge. Unless the
General Assembly provides clearly defined guidelines for the court, the
71. Id. at _,385 N.E.2d at 621, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at - 385 N.E.2d at 620-21, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
73. "If the proponent of the statement is able to establish this possibility of trustworthiness, it is the function of the jury alone to determine whether the declaration is sufficient to
create reasonable doubt of guilt." Id. at -, 385 N.E.2d at 621, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
74. 219 Va. at 408, 247 S.E.2d at 688.
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application of the trustworthiness standard for third party confessions
will result in continuing controversy.
Donna J. Katos

